The Longwe Petition – Can President Hichilema’s Nomination Survive a Constitutional Challenge?
In a legal challenge that has sent shockwaves through Zambia’s political landscape just months before the 13 August 2026 general election, Charles Longwe, a longstanding member of the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND), has petitioned the Constitutional Court to nullify President Hakainde Hichilema’s candidacy. The petition, filed in last Friday, contends that Mr Hichilema’s nomination as the UPND’s presidential candidate is unconstitutional and void because it arose from party organs and officebearers whose mandates had expired. The case raises profound questions about internal party democracy, the role of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), and the ability of the courts to remain impartial amid allegations of executive heavyhandedness.
Mr Longwe, a UPND member since 2001, argues that the party has persistently failed to hold regular, free and fair intraparty elections as required by Article 60 of the Zambian Constitution and the UPND’s own constitution. According to the petition, the party’s National Management Committee, elected on 14 February 2021, completed its prescribed fiveyear term on 13 February 2026. Lower party structures – at branch, constituency, district and provincial levels – elected in 2020 expired in 2023. Yet no nationwide elective processes were conducted until 15 April 2026, when a General Assembly belatedly elected President Hichilema unopposed. The nomination papers, including the adoption certificate signed by party officials, were filed on 22 May 2026. Mr Longwe contends that the officials who signed that certificate, including the President himself, were acting after their constitutional tenures had expired, rendering the entire nomination process invalid.
The petition invokes a web of constitutional and statutory provisions. Article 60(2)(d) of the Constitution obliges political parties to “promote and practise democracy through regular, free and fair elections within the party”. Article 60(2)(e) guarantees members the right to participate in the affairs of their party. Section 18 of the Constitution of Zambia Act, No. 1 of 2016 required all political parties existing before the 2016 amendments to align their constitutions, structures and operations with the new constitutional order within a transitional period – an obligation that Mr Longwe says the UPND has flouted. Further, section 30(1)(b) of the Electoral Process Act (as amended) demands that a presidential candidate deliver an adoption certificate “signed by the president and secretarygeneral of the sponsoring political party”. If those officeholders lacked lawful authority, the certificate is a nullity. The petition also cites Article 52(4), which expressly permits any person to challenge a candidate’s nomination before a court.
The ECZ, cited as the third respondent, accepted Mr Hichilema’s nomination on 22 May 2026. Mr Longwe argues that the ECZ acted inconsistently with Articles 52 and 60 of the Constitution by validating a nomination built on expired party structures. Under the amended Electoral Process Act and the constitutional amendments known as Bill 7 (formally the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 7 of 2024), the ECZ’s powers to scrutinise candidates’ qualifications have been strengthened. Bill 7 introduced stricter verification mechanisms, including enhanced requirements for political parties to demonstrate compliance with their own constitutions and with Article 60. The ECZ cannot simply accept a nomination on its face; it has a positive duty to inquire into whether the sponsoring party’s internal governance conforms to constitutional standards. If the Court finds that the UPND’s structures were expired, the ECZ’s acceptance of the nomination will be retrospectively unlawful, exposing the Commission to a declaration that it breached its constitutional mandate. This could force the ECZ to strike Mr Hichilema from the ballot or, alternatively, to postpone the election in respect of the presidency – a scenario fraught with political crisis.
Perhaps the most delicate aspect of the petition is the allegation, implicit but unmistakable of judicial bias. Mr Longwe’s counsel has not directly accused the Constitutional Court of partiality, but the broader context is well known: President Hichilema’s administration has been accused of wielding what critics call “mingalato” a colloquial term for a network of political enforcers, sometimes likened to party militia or coercive state machinery to intimidate opponents and pressure institutions, including the judiciary. Several opposition figures have faced arrest on contentious charges, and lawyers who have taken on politically sensitive cases have reported harassment. In such an environment, how can the Constitutional Court adjudicate fairly?
The answer lies in the Court’s own jurisprudence and institutional culture. Under Article 128 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has original and final jurisdiction to hear petitions alleging contravention of the Constitution. To withstand accusations of bias, the Court must do three things. First, it must insist on strict evidentiary standards, requiring Mr Longwe to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the UPND’s structures had indeed expired and that no valid renewal occurred. Second, it must disregard any extrajudicial pressure, including statements from political figures or “mingalato” operatives, and rely solely on the Constitution, the UPND’s own constitution, and the Electoral Process Act. Third, it must deliver a reasoned, publicly available judgment that addresses each ground of petition even if that judgment is politically inconvenient for the sitting President. Should the Court fail in these respects, its legitimacy would be gravely damaged.
On the merits, the Court should declare that the UPND’s prolonged failure to hold regular intraparty elections violated Articles 8 and 60 of the Constitution. The evidence is compelling: the party did not hold elective general assemblies in 2011, 2016, or at any time between 2021 and 2026 except for the belated April 2026 assembly. The Registrar of Societies issued a public directive in October 2023 demanding compliance, which the UPND ignored. The National Management Committee’s tenure expired on 13 February 2026; the lower structures expired even earlier. By continuing to exercise authority after those dates – including by adopting a presidential candidate, the party’s officebearers acted without constitutional mandate. Consequently, the adoption certificate signed on 22 May 2026 was a nullity, and the ECZ’s acceptance of that certificate was invalid.
Therefore, on the basis of the Mr Longwe’s submissions and a strict application of the relevant constitutional provisions, the Court could judiciously interrogate the relief declaring the nomination of the Hichilema as the UPND’s presidential candidate unconstitutional and void, setting aside the ECZ’s acceptance of that nomination, and directing the Registrar of Societies to require the UPND to conduct fresh intraparty elections across all structures before any further nomination.
Whether the Hichilema may lawfully stand in the August 2026 election would then depend on whether the UPND, after remedying its internal governance deficiencies, nominates him in compliance with the Constitution and the Electoral Process Act. A contrary finding would require the Court to reconcile the admitted expiry of party structures with the validity of acts undertaken by those structures. The Court’s determination will ultimately rest on its interpretation of Article 60, section 18 of the 2016 Act, and the evidence of whether the UPND’s late April 2026 General Assembly cured prior noncompliance.