Winning power is not the same as keeping legitimacy
Zambia’s president was fairly elected. That mandate is now being tested by how he governs, not how he won.
By Chitundu
Power and legitimacy are often treated as though they are the same thing. They are not. A government can hold the legal authority to rule and still struggle to command the deeper trust and moral acceptance of the people it governs.
That distinction matters as Zambia approaches another defining moment in its democratic life. Hakainde Hichilema was constitutionally elected in August 2021, with a clear mandate under Zambia’s constitution to govern the republic. That is a settled fact, not a matter for debate. But legitimacy is not something the ballot box confers once and for all; it is renewed, or eroded, by the daily conduct of power.
History does not judge leaders only by how they came to office. It judges them by what they did with the authority they were given.
My argument is that while President Hichilema holds constitutional power beyond dispute, his administration has steadily lost democratic legitimacy through the way it has managed political institutions, constitutional processes, state resources and public bodies since taking office.
The danger in any democracy begins when those in power mistake legality for licence. Winning an election authorises a government to govern. It does not authorise it to reshape the political environment, weaken opponents, capture institutions or rewrite the rules of competition to favour those already in office.
The real test of a democratic government is not whether it can win elections. It is whether it can create the conditions in which it might lose one.
A democracy is not defined by the existence of elections but by whether citizens believe those elections are free, fair and meaningful, and by whether political competition exists in practice, not only on paper.
Since 2021, opposition figures have argued that Zambia’s democratic space has narrowed. They point to the difficulty opposition parties face in securing permits for rallies, while the governing party enjoys comparatively unrestricted visibility and mobility. A democracy cannot claim to be in good health when one side of the contest has the advantages of incumbency and the other struggles to exercise basic political freedoms.
The fragmentation of the Patriotic Front after its 2021 defeat is often cited as the clearest example. The PF lost power at the ballot box, but what followed was not simply an internal party dispute. The involvement of state institutions, notably the Registrar of Societies, created a widespread perception that government was shaping the opposition’s internal affairs. The subsequent contest over the party’s leadership, including the emergence of the FDD as a vehicle associated with Brian Mundubile and other former PF officials, raised a legitimate question: was government allowing genuine opposition renewal, or did it have an interest in a weaker, divided opposition?
An opposition party should be defeated by the strength of its ideas and the judgment of voters, not reshaped by the machinery of the state. A democracy becomes fragile when a ruling party seeks not only to beat its opponents but to decide who those opponents will be.
My concerns about legitimacy extend to the treatment of Zambia’s constitutional order. A constitution is the foundation of a republic and a check on the abuse of power, not an instrument to be reached for when useful and set aside when not.
The dispute over constitutional amendments after 2021, including the attempted Bill 7 changes, raised real questions about whether the process was strengthening Zambian democracy or serving narrower political interests. So did the departure from precedent in the debate over former president Edgar Lungu’s eligibility, which left many Zambians wondering whether constitutional principle was being applied consistently, or selectively, depending on who stood to benefit.
A constitution must protect everyone, including political opponents. It cannot mean one thing for the government and another for the opposition.
The amendment of electoral laws close to a general election deepened these concerns. Electoral rules are the foundation of political competition; changing them shortly before a vote invites suspicion, because citizens need confidence that the rules of the game are not being altered by those who benefit from the change. Democracy requires fairness in the process, not only in the declared result.
Zambia rejected one-party rule because it understood the dangers of a single political organisation dominating both state and society. Some citizens now fear the country is drifting toward a political culture in which the governing party becomes difficult to distinguish from the state itself.
This is not an argument about any province or community. No region owns a political party, and no citizen should be judged by their birthplace. It is an argument about the model of politics being built. A style of governance rooted in UPND’s dominance of Southern Province cannot become the national template. A democracy in which one political organisation controls institutions and public life without meaningful competition is not the democracy Zambians fought for, and the country should resist any drift toward a de facto one-party state.
That concern extends to appointments across government. A country as diverse as Zambia should see that diversity reflected in the leadership of its institutions. The issue is not that individuals from any particular region should be excluded from service; every Zambian has that right. The issue is the perception, held by many citizens, that access to senior positions in state institutions, security services and parastatals increasingly runs through one regional and political network. When citizens come to believe that proximity to power depends on geography or loyalty rather than merit, national unity suffers. The republic belongs to all Zambians, and its institutions should inspire confidence in all of them.
Economic management is another test of legitimacy. The UPND came to office promising to resolve Zambia’s debt crisis, restore economic confidence and deliver prosperity. Many citizens still question whether the current path represents genuine transformation or simply the deferral of hard choices.
Debt restructuring has been presented as a signature achievement, but restructuring is not the same as elimination. It manages the obligation without discharging it, and future generations will still carry the consequences of today’s decisions.
The sale of Mopani Copper Mines, the return of Konkola Copper Mines to private control, and the mining concessions and tax incentives granted since 2021 have all raised questions about whether Zambia is securing fair value from its natural resources. Minerals belong to the Zambian people; government is their custodian, not their owner. Economic legitimacy is not measured by international praise or investor confidence alone; it is measured by whether ordinary citizens experience improved living standards.
The pattern of prosecutions involving opposition figures, among them Bowman Lusambo, Nixon Chilangwa, Ronald Chitotela, Joseph Malanji, Xavier Chungu and Francis Kapwepwe, has left many critics with the impression that the justice system is being used against government’s opponents. Similar concerns have followed cases involving critics such as Emmanuel Mwamba, Joseph Banda, Thomas Zyambo and Brebner Changala, who argue that criticism of government is being treated as a criminal matter.
To be clear, government has a duty to fight corruption, and no official should be beyond accountability. But that accountability must be seen to apply equally, regardless of political allegiance. When citizens conclude that the law is being deployed selectively, it is the legitimacy of the institutions themselves, not just the individuals in the dock, that suffers. A confident democracy does not fear scrutiny; it treats criticism as a source of accountability rather than a threat to be managed.
The relationship between the state and the church has also become a matter of national concern. The Catholic Church has long played a role in Zambia’s democratic life, from peacebuilding to the defence of human dignity. Disputes over the closure of the Cathedral of the Child Jesus in Lusaka, and reports of tension between church leaders and state security institutions, have unsettled those who see the church as one of the few independent voices left in public life. A government secure in its record should welcome scrutiny from religious leaders and civil society, not appear to discourage it. Democracy is not sustained by silence; it is sustained by open argument.
President Hichilema holds constitutional power that is not in question. But constitutional power alone does not guarantee democratic legitimacy. Legitimacy has to be earned continually, through restraint, fairness, accountability and respect for institutions that outlast any single administration.
The measure of a government is not how long it stays in office, but what it leaves behind: stronger institutions, a deeper democracy, a more united country.
Power can command obedience. Only legitimacy earns the judgment of history.
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Zambia’s president was fairly elected. That mandate is now being tested by how he governs, not how he won
