HAS ZAMBIA ADOPTED NIGERIAS’ 1993 COUP STRATEGY TO MAINTAIN A GRIP ON POWER? THE PARALLEL ORDEALS OF NIGERIA’S ABIOLA AND ZAMBIA’S MUNDUBILE – COLLETE STEENEKAMP PHD
HAS ZAMBIA ADOPTED NIGERIAS’ 1993 COUP STRATEGY TO MAINTAIN A GRIP ON POWER? THE PARALLEL ORDEALS OF NIGERIA’S ABIOLA AND ZAMBIA’S MUNDUBILE – COLLETE STEENEKAMP PHD
WRITTEN BY COLLETE STEENEKAMP PHD – ELECTORAL AND SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST – CENTER FOR SECURITY AND PEACE STUDIES
In the annals of African democracy, few spectacles are as tragic—and as telling—as the story of a presidential election contender who is never allowed to see the democratic process through. Across two generations and two nations, the cases of Nigeria’s Moshood Abiola and Zambia’s Brian Mundubile appear to echo one another with haunting precision. Both contested presidential elections, both maintained that they were leading based on results available to their respective campaigns, and both were arrested and charged with treason after asserting themselves at moments when the democratic process was, in their view, being undermined.
Abiola of Nigeria announced that he had won the election and was subsequently detained and imprisoned on treason charges. Similarly, Brian Mundubile announced that he was winning the election and has since been detained on treason charges. More importantly, Mundubile was prevented from having his electoral concerns tested and determined by the courts, leaving the legitimacy of Hakainde Hichilema’s victory open to serious question.
In Nigeria, a new president, who was widely regarded by opponents as having come to power through a military coup following the annulment of the election, was sworn in against the backdrop of a stolen electoral mandate
In Zambia, Hakainde Hichilema is set to be sworn in as President against a similarly troubling background: an election petition that could have determined whether his electoral victory was valid was, according to the opposition, prevented from being filed after courts across the country were closed on the final day for filing petitions.
This is particularly significant given the concerns raised by many Zambians and international observers regarding what they have described as significant irregularities in the conduct of the election. Hichilema’s victory may therefore remain contested for as long as the electoral allegations raised by Mundubile and others are not subjected to judicial determination.
The fundamental issue is not whether Hichilema should be declared the winner, but whether the electoral process that produced that declaration can withstand independent judicial scrutiny. Where an election is disputed, the courts are the institution mandated to determine whether the result was lawfully and credibly obtained.
If an opposition candidate is prevented from filing an election petition, the question of whether the election was valid remains unresolved. In that sense, the absence of a judicial determination does not necessarily establish that Hichilema’s victory was illegitimate, but it leaves a cloud of uncertainty over its legitimacy—one that can only be removed through a credible and lawful judicial process
THE 1993 NIGERIAN ELECTION: A PROMISE BETRAYED
The June 12, 1993, Nigerian presidential election is widely regarded as one of the freest and fairest elections in the country’s history. Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola, a wealthy businessman and candidate of the Social Democratic Party, emerged as the clear frontrunner. As results were announced, Abiola maintained a decisive lead.
But those in power had other plans. Citing concerns that were never satisfactorily resolved, the military government annulled the election. The decision triggered widespread outrage, protests and violence, with hundreds of people reportedly losing their lives.
For Abiola, the annulment was unacceptable. He asserted his electoral mandate and declared himself the rightful winner of the election. He was subsequently arrested, charged with treason and imprisoned.
The annulment of June 12 became one of the darkest moments in Nigeria’s democratic history—a moment in which the expressed will of the electorate was subordinated to the interests of those controlling state power.
THE 2026 ZAMBIAN ELECTION: HISTORY REPEATS?
Thirty-three years later, a remarkably similar sequence of events appears to be unfolding in Zambia.
Brian Mundubile, contesting the August 13, 2026, presidential election on the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity ticket against incumbent President Hakainde Hichilema, asserted during the counting process that information available to his campaign indicated that he was winning the election.
According to reports and accounts emerging from the opposition, the counting and announcement of results were interrupted for more than five hours. During this period, security forces were reportedly involved in the removal of some party agents from polling stations. When the announcement of results resumed, opposition representatives alleged that some results favouring Hichilema differed from figures previously witnessed by their polling agents.
Mundubile subsequently stated that, based on results witnessed by his agents, he was winning the election and warned against subverting the will of the people. Yet a political assertion of this nature—one that opposition leaders themselves including Zambian incumbent President have historically made during elections—was subsequently portrayed as a threat to national security. Hakainde Hichilema had never been arrested in the past for rejecting elections results and asserting himself as a winner; when he is President, what was done by him is criminalized.
This raises an uncomfortable question: why should an opposition candidate’s assertion that he is winning an election be treated as a criminal threat when similar claims have previously been made by politicians, including Hichilema himself, while in opposition?
The events that followed intensified the controversy. The day after the election, security forces reportedly raided a Lusaka property linked to Mundubile. During the operation, a former cabinet minister was killed and several opposition politicians were arrested.
More controversially, on the final day for filing election petitions, access to the Zambian courts was reportedly disrupted, preventing the opposition from pursuing a legal challenge to the election results.
This is particularly significant because an election petition is not an act of treason. It is a constitutionally recognised mechanism through which the legitimacy of an election can be tested. Where an election is alleged to have been substantially compromised, the courts are precisely the institution through which such claims should be examined.
THE PARALLELS: WHEN DEMOCRACY’S DEFENDERS BECOME TRAITORS
The parallels between the two cases are stark.
Moshood Abiola claimed the mandate of the Nigerian people after the June 12 election, only for the military government to annul the election and subsequently imprison him after he asserted his claim to the presidency.
Brian Mundubile, by contrast, has not been afforded the same opportunity to seek judicial redress over what he and his supporters believe were irregularities in the election. If the opposition was prevented from filing a petition within the legally prescribed period, then a crucial democratic safeguard was effectively denied.
The legitimacy of an election does not rest solely on the announcement of results. In a constitutional democracy, legitimacy also depends on whether the electoral process was conducted according to law and whether those who challenge the result are given a genuine opportunity to have their claims heard.
Zambia itself has previously demonstrated the importance of judicial review of presidential elections, as have other African countries, including Kenya. Where courts determine that an election was fundamentally compromised, the law can provide for the cancellation of the result and, where appropriate, a fresh election.
The right to challenge the exercise of state power therefore lies at the heart of democracy. It is precisely this right that appears to have come at an extraordinary cost for both Abiola and Mundubile.
Both men were arrested and charged with treason after asserting their political positions in the aftermath of disputed electoral processes.
The legal circumstances are not identical. Nigeria in 1993 was under military rule, while Zambia in 2026 is formally a constitutional democracy. Yet the disturbing similarity lies in the use of the machinery of the state against political actors who refused to simply accept an outcome they believed did not reflect the will of the electorate.
Abiola was detained without trial for years, while the judiciary under military rule was unable to provide an effective democratic remedy. In Zambia, the reported closure or sealing of courts at the critical moment for filing election petitions raises a similarly profound question about access to justice.
In both instances, the state’s response to electoral dissent risks transforming a political dispute into a matter of national security.
A QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY
The parallels between Abiola and Mundubile are therefore not merely biographical. They raise a much deeper question about the nature of democracy itself.
What happens when the person claiming to have won an election is treated not as a political opponent entitled to challenge the result, but as a threat to the state?
Treason is among the gravest charges a state can bring against an individual. Its use against political opponents in the aftermath of disputed elections should therefore demand the highest level of scrutiny.
Nigeria’s June 12 election was annulled by a military government that ultimately refused to recognise the electoral mandate expressed by millions of Nigerians. Zambia’s current crisis is different in its constitutional setting, but allegations that the opposition was prevented from accessing the courts strike at the same fundamental principle: the right of citizens to have electoral disputes resolved through lawful and independent institutions.
There is an even greater irony in the language of treason.
If treason means betraying the state, then a government that suppresses the electoral will of its citizens raises a difficult moral and constitutional question: who, ultimately, is betraying whom—the citizen who demands that his vote be respected, or the state that prevents the people from determining who governs them?
The consequences extend far beyond Abiola and Mundubile.
When an election is annulled, when a candidate is prevented from challenging results in court, or when political dissent is transformed into a criminal offence, the damage is not confined to one individual or one political party. It weakens public confidence in elections, undermines constitutional institutions and creates a dangerous precedent in which political power becomes more important than the consent of the governed.
As Zambia’s opposition leader faces a treason charge while in detention, and as Nigeria continues to live with the historical trauma of June 12, the lesson remains clear:
WHEN ELECTIONS ARE DISPUTED AND THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THEM IS CRIMINALISED, DEMOCRACY SUFFERS A WOUND THAT MAY TAKE GENERATIONS TO HEAL.
The stories of Abiola and Mundubile should therefore serve as a warning to every African country that aspires to genuine democratic governance. Elections are not merely about announcing winners. Democracy requires that votes be counted transparently, that political opponents be allowed to challenge disputed results, that courts remain accessible, and that the state cannot turn political disagreement into treason.
Otherwise, the greatest betrayal is not committed by those who demand that their votes be respected. It is committed against democracy itself. EU Election Observation Mission to Zambia European Union in Zambia U.S. Embassy Zambia SADC