ZAMBIA KEEPS CHANGING THE DRIVER — BUT THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME
ZAMBIA KEEPS CHANGING THE DRIVER — BUT THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAINS THE SAME
In April 2017, police raided the Lusaka home of then-opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema in the early hours of the morning and arrested him on treason charges.
The charges followed an incident in Western Province in which Hichilema’s convoy was accused of failing to give way to President Edgar Lungu’s motorcade. Hichilema spent 127 days in custody before the Director of Public Prosecutions entered a nolle prosequi, bringing the treason proceedings to an end.
Nine years later, the political roles have changed dramatically.
Hichilema is now President, having been declared the winner of the August 13, 2026 presidential election, while his principal challenger, Brian Mundubile, has faced treason-related charges following the election. Mundubile has disputed the election result and alleged irregularities in the electoral process.
The striking contrast raises a question that has followed Zambian politics for decades: does the country change its political leadership without changing the institutions and rules through which power is exercised?
Democratic Progressive Party leader Antonio Mwanza has argued that the quality of governance depends less on the personalities occupying State House than on the strength of the institutions surrounding them.
That argument provides a useful lens through which to examine Zambia’s political history.
Kenneth Kaunda presided over major national institutions, including the University of Zambia and University Teaching Hospital, but his administration also established a one-party political system.
Frederick Chiluba came to power in 1991 on a platform of restoring multiparty democracy. A decade later, his attempt to seek constitutional changes that would have enabled a third presidential term was abandoned following sustained opposition from churches, civil society groups and others.
Under the Patriotic Front, opposition parties repeatedly complained about restrictions imposed under the Public Order Act. The UPND was among the parties that experienced those restrictions while in opposition.
The political actors changed. The arguments surrounding the exercise of State power remained remarkably familiar.
THE 2026 ELECTION AND THE COURTS
The events surrounding the 2026 election have added another chapter to that debate.
The Electoral Commission of Zambia declared Hichilema the winner on August 18. Mundubile subsequently challenged the result and cited alleged irregularities in the conduct, counting, transmission and declaration of results. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group separately reported that its parallel verification confirmed Hichilema had crossed the constitutional threshold for victory, while also raising questions about aspects of the official figures
The circumstances surrounding access to the courts became particularly contentious.
On August 24, the day on which the deadline for filing a presidential election petition expired, major court premises were closed. Police described the closure as an “intelligence-led and preventive measure”, while Human Rights Watch said the closure effectively prevented potential legal challenges from being filed.
The episode generated criticism from lawyers and civil society organisations over access to justice.
Whatever the competing explanations for the closure, the timing placed the judiciary at the centre of a political controversy at precisely the point when an electoral dispute could have required judicial consideration.
That experience illustrates a broader institutional question: how independent and accessible are the mechanisms intended to resolve political disputes when those mechanisms are needed most?
THE POLITICS OF ARREST
The subsequent arrests of opposition figures and other political actors have further intensified the debate about the relationship between law enforcement and political competition.
Government authorities have maintained that investigations and prosecutions are based on alleged criminal conduct rather than political affiliation. Opposition figures and their lawyers have, in some cases, questioned the circumstances and timing of arrests and the handling of investigations.
The competing claims underline the importance of due process.
Where serious offences are alleged, the credibility of the justice system depends on evidence being tested through established legal procedures rather than political arguments being allowed to determine guilt or innocence.
The same principle applied when Hichilema was arrested in 2017. At the time, Amnesty International criticised the treason charges and described them as an abuse of the criminal justice system, while the authorities maintained their allegations against him. The prosecution eventually discontinued the case.
The historical irony is difficult to miss.
A political leader who once experienced the criminal justice system from the opposition benches now presides over institutions that exercise the same constitutional powers over today’s opposition.
THE THIRD-TERM QUESTION
The debate over presidential tenure has also returned to Zambia’s political conversation.
Recent calls from some political actors for changes to presidential term limits have prompted responses from within and outside the ruling UPND. Some UPND-linked voices have publicly rejected suggestions that President Hichilema should seek a third term, while civil society figures have also spoken against removing or extending constitutional limits.
The issue is particularly sensitive because Zambia has previously experienced a major political contest over presidential term limits.
For supporters of constitutional term limits, the question is one of institutional continuity and predictable succession. Those advocating constitutional change frame the matter differently, arguing that constitutional provisions can be amended through the prescribed legal process.
The distinction matters because constitutional change is ultimately a question for Zambia’s established legal and political processes rather than an issue that should be determined by speculation about an individual president’s intentions.
President Hichilema has previously stated that he does not intend to seek a third term. The renewed public discussion nevertheless demonstrates why presidential succession remains an important issue in Zambian politics.
THE INSTITUTIONS BEHIND THE POLITICIANS
The deeper issue is therefore not simply whether one political party is behaving differently from its predecessors.
It is whether Zambia’s institutions are sufficiently independent and durable to constrain whichever party happens to control State House.
Questions surrounding the appointment of electoral commissioners, the independence and administration of the judiciary, the operation of public media, prosecutorial independence and the policing of political activity have featured repeatedly in Zambia’s political debates.
These are not exclusively UPND questions. They have followed successive administrations.
The concern raised by critics is that institutions designed to serve the republic can become vulnerable to the interests of whichever political party controls the executive.
The counterargument from governments is generally that the institutions remain governed by law and that allegations of political interference should be tested against evidence.
That disagreement is precisely why institutional safeguards matter.
CHANGING THE DRIVER OR REPAIRING THE SYSTEM?
The metaphor is simple: Zambia has repeatedly changed the driver without necessarily changing the car.
Each administration arrives promising reform. Each inherits institutions shaped by its predecessors. And once in government, every administration acquires an interest in preserving at least some of the powers it previously criticised.
The pattern has appeared in different forms under successive governments.
The MMD experienced it. The Patriotic Front experienced it. The UPND is now experiencing its own version of the same institutional pressures.
Political fortunes also change quickly.
Figures who accumulate influence and wealth while their parties control government can find their circumstances transformed when political power changes hands. That pattern has been visible across Zambia’s multiparty era.
For the current administration, the institutional challenge is therefore larger than winning an election or completing an economic programme.
It is about what happens to the rules of political competition when the governing party eventually becomes the opposition.
That is the test that every administration ultimately faces.
THE QUESTION FOR ZAMBIA
The debate should therefore extend beyond personalities.
How should electoral institutions be appointed and supervised? How can access to the courts be protected during politically sensitive periods? What safeguards should govern arrests and prosecutions involving political actors? How should public media maintain impartiality during elections? And how should constitutional term limits be protected or amended?
These are institutional questions that do not disappear when one president leaves office.
Zambia’s political history demonstrates that today’s opposition can become tomorrow’s government, and today’s government can eventually become tomorrow’s opposition.
That makes institutional rules relevant to everyone — regardless of which party occupies State House.
The ultimate measure of democratic reform is therefore not whether the rules work for the party in power today.
It is whether those same rules remain acceptable when the political circumstances are reversed.
That is the challenge Zambia continues to confront: changing the driver is relatively easy. Changing the system that governs the driver is the harder task.